For many sabermetric types, the A’s of recent seasons have represented the ideal offense: a slugging (and sluggish) line-up that understands the importance of drawing walks and swinging for the fences. Little ball is not in vogue at the Coliseum. Oakland’s popularity among the stat-geek crowd also derives in no small part from the fact that A’s General Manager Billy Beane knows what on-base percentage and slugging percentage are without having to consult the glossary of Total Baseball.
The world champion Anahiem Angels appear to have challenged Oakland’s modern-day Weaverball strategy. As New Jersey Star-Ledger columnist Lawrence Rocca recently wrote,
The Angels won with a selfless style of hitting that manager Mike Scioscia introduced in spring training, then tracked during the season, keeping track of untraditional statistics such as productive outs; getting ahead in the count after falling behind; and fouling off two-strike pitches.
“We never would have been able to maintain the consistent pressure that we did on teams to create offense if we didn’t play that way,” Scioscia said recently. “If you don’t execute (fundamentals), you have to slug your way back in. We didn’t have that type of club to be able to stay ahead that way. I don’t think it’s the only way to play baseball, but it’s the way we had to.”
What’s most amazing of all about the Angels’ method of success last season is that it’s so rare. And that it’s almost exactly opposite of the philosophy of their AL West rival A’s, who have made the playoffs three straight seasons.
The A’s stress on-base percentage and slugging percentage, and never give away outs. They follow the strategy laid out by Hall of Fame Orioles manager Earl Weaver, whose guiding principle was often summed up as “pitching, defense and three-run homers.”
Putting aside the question of whether a hitter is “selfless” or selfish based on whether he plays like the Angels, or, like the A’s, seeks to (1) get on base so their teammates can drive them in and (2) hit for power to drive in their teammates, are the Angels on to something? While the Angels’ World Series victory may not be proof that their offensive approach is superior to that of the A’s — after all, Weaver was pretty successful with the Orioles using the three-homer approach — it is worth looking at Anaheim and Oakland’s offenses to see what can be learned about their different philosophies.
As an initial matter, the Angels and A’s were actually remarkably similar in terms of OBP and slugging percentage:
Team OBP Slg ------------------- Anaheim .341 .443 Oakland .339 .442
With those kinds of numbers, one would expect two teams to score roughly the same number of runs. Yet the Angels outscored the A’s 851 to 800, a significant difference. Was this the result of the Angels doing more “little things” to move along their baserunners, being more proactive in working the count and exerting greater pressure on the other team’s defense?
Perhaps. Consider that Oakland had 22 fewer baserunners than Anaheim but left 32 additional runners on base. That alone could explain a 54-run differential. These are the numbers:
Team Runners Left On ------------------------- Anaheim 2,139 1,165 Oakland 2,117 1,197
(Runners are defined as hits plus bases on balls plus hit by pitch.)
Clearly the Angels were more efficient with their baserunners. Next we turn to their situational hitting. That typically explains the difference in these situations. Using just OBP and slugging percentage, the teams remain quite similar:
RunnersOn ScoringPos Team OBP Slg OBP Slg ------------------------------- Anaheim .359 .447 .359 .443 Oakland .360 .441 .362 .435
The Angels hit with a little more pop than the Athletics, but the difference is not massive. What is massive, and what is overlooked by just checking OBP and slugging percentage, is that the Angels batted for a distinctly superior average with runners on base and in scoring position:
RunnersOn ScoringPos Team Avg Avg ------------------------------- Anaheim .296 .290 Oakland .273 .270
Not only did the Angels bat for a higher average in such situations, but they put the ball in play on outs more often. In total, the Angels had 85 more plate appearances than the A’s with runners on base, but the Angels put the ball in play with runners on base 249 more times. The figures for runners in scoring position are a little closer: the Angels had 206 more plate appearances with runners in scoring position and put the ball in play 234 more times.
Those 206 additional plate appearances with runners in scoring position might also suggest that the Angels were better at pushing their runners into scoring position by doing little things to advance runners. It might also be a result of the fact that more of Oakland’s power resulted in home runs, while Anaheim’s power resulted in more doubles and triples. The A’s out-homered the Angels 205 to 152, while the Angels hit 365 doubles plus triples to Oakland’s 307. But the difference of Oakland’s home runs versus Anaheim’s doubles and triples cannot explain the entire disparity of 206 plate appearances.
Not only did they hit for a higher average, but the Angels put their outs in play more often. The Angels put 80 percent of their outs in play with runners on base. The A’s put 74 percent of their outs in play in the same situation. And the Angels put 78 percent of their outs in play with runners in scoring position. In the same situation, the A’s put 74 percent of their outs in play. Put another way, despite 249 fewer plate appearances with runners on base, the A’s drew 69 more walks and struck out 95 additional times. And despite 234 fewer plate appearances with runners in scoring position, they drew 17 more walks and struck out 11 more times.
That’s all a mouthful, so take a look at it in table form with runners on base:
Runners On Balls Outs Team PA BB SO InPlay Pct InPlay Pct ------------------------------------------------- Anaheim 2814 240 361 2213 79% 1446 80% Oakland 2729 309 456 1964 72% 1303 74%
And in scoring position:
Scoring Position Balls Outs Team PA BB SO InPlay Pct InPlay Pct ------------------------------------------------- Anaheim 1774 179 249 1346 76% 884 78% Oakland 1568 196 260 1112 71% 752 74%
So was it the Angels’ ability/willingness/luck to get wood on the ball when ducks were on the pond that allowed them to score 51 more runs with otherwise comparable offensive production? Surely having the ball out there among the fielders, rather than in the catcher’s mitt, 200 more times with runners on base must have made some difference.
Before writing off Weaverball/Beaneball, though, it would be useful to see numbers over a larger sample size. Moreover, it would be helpful to have the actual data on runners advanced with outs. Major League Baseball’s official statistician, the Elias Sports Bureau, and the media’s chief statistics provider, STATS, Inc., keep track of those kinds of things, but the information is not in the public domain.
Mike Scioscia probably needs no more convincing, however: the trophy with the flags on it is evidence enough.