Statistical analysts claim that baseball players tend to peak between the ages of 26 and 32. If that finding is accurate, then Astros fans have reason to be optimistic about the next few seasons. Aside from a pair of future Hall of Famers and a veteran catcher renown for his defense, the Astros have a prospective line-up entering its prime. Ages are as of opening day 2002:
Pos Player Age --------------------- C Ausmus 32 1B Bagwell 33 2B Biggio 36 3B Ensberg 26 SS Everett 25 LF Ward 26 CF Hidalgo 26 RF Berkman 26
The starting rotation is similarly promising:
Pitcher Age --------------------- Roy Oswalt 24 Wade Miller 25 Shane Reynolds 34 Carlos Hernandez 21
The fifth spot is likely to be contested by Dave Mlicki, 33, and Tim Redding, 24. If he fails to make the rotation, Redding will likely join Octavio Dotel, 26, in the bullpen. General manager Gerry Hunsicker has also mentioned the possibility of adding Scott Linebrink, 25, and the slightly less youthful Jim Mann, 27, and Ricky Stone, 27, as relievers.
That upside means the Astros have plausible solutions within their system to most of the biggest questions fans have pondered this winter: third base, shortstop, center field and the bullpen. Moreover, the Astros have made or may make a few modest acquisitions to further address these questions.
Third Base
Much to the dismay of many fans, the Astros elected not to retain the services of Vinny Castilla. Following his acquisition on May 15, Castilla provided the Astros an anchor at third base after Bill Spiers went on the disabled list with a recurring back injury, which eventually caused his retirement, and Chris Truby squandered a chance to become a starter.
Castilla’s performance (.270/.320/.492) for the Astros was acceptable in the context of three factors: (1) he was replacing Truby (.206/.276/.441); (2) he far exceeded expectations given his performance with the Devil Rays (.215/.247/.344); and (3) Tampa Bay paid the vast majority of his salary.
There was nothing, however, to justify the Astros giving him a deal approaching the two-year, $8-million contract the 34-year-old Castilla signed with the Braves. Castilla’s only sustained success in the major leagues has been in the best hitter’s park in baseball history, Coors Field. Even his numbers with the Astros ranked Castilla among major-league third basemen just 21st in OBP and eighth in slugging average, despite playing in the park formerly known as Enron Field, one of the league’s bandboxes.
Morgan Ensberg presents the disadvantage of being rather old for a rookie. That said, Ensberg tore up pitching at AA Round Rock (.300/.416/.545) in 2000 and AAA New Orleans (.310/.397/.592) in 2001. His plate discipline alone represents a quantum leap from Truby and Castilla. If Ensberg, whose defense is reputed to be decent, hits anywhere near as well as he did in the minors, Castilla will be forgotten.
If Ensberg fails, the Astros face the unpleasant option of using Truby again, assuming he remains with the team. The Denver Post recently reported that Truby and right-handed reliever Nelson Cruz might be dealt to the Rockies for left-handed reliever Mike Myers, which is a trade the Astros should execute if they get the chance.
The Astros re-signed switch-hitting Jose Vizcaino, 34, (.277/.322/.344), who has 164 career games at third base, to their bench. The Astros might also be in the market for a left-handed hitting third baseman to back up Ensberg, but Hunsicker recently said such an acquisition is unlikely. If the Astros do make such a move, one possibility folks have mentioned is Tyler Houston, who played for the Brewers last year (.289/.343/.472).
Shortstop
In his second year at New Orleans, Adam Everett regressed offensively. His biggest offensive asset, his OBP, dropped by 30 points from 2000 (.245/.363/.342) to 2001 (.249/.330/.365), although his slugging average did increase by 20 points. Given that Everett managed to steal 24 bases in 29 attempts, he is probably better off concentrating on getting on base rather than hitting for power.
Everett’s glove is likely to help him seize the starting shortstop role for the Astros in 2002. His defensive credentials are established. If Everett can post an OBP somewhere near .350 and continue stealing bases, the Astros should be delighted to have him at eighth in the order.
Consider that Astros eight-hitters in 2001 posted just a .316 OBP, although their .388 slugging average considerably exceeds anything Everett is likely to achieve. Furthermore, last season National League eight-hitters posted a .308 OBP and .361 slugging average, and National League shortstops posted a .316 OBP and .387 slugging average. Everett at least has a shot to be above-average at reaching base.
Yet Everett will play himself out of the line-up if he struggles to hit .230 or cannot keep his OBP and slugging average considerably above .300. In the event of Everett’s demise, the Astros still have Vizcaino as well as Julio Lugo, 26, who would probably be the assumed starter had he performed better in the field or at the plate last season (.263/.326/.372).
What the Astros should not do is spend a few million dollars on a veteran shortstop unlikely to have skills much better than Everett’s. Rey Sanchez, whom the Braves acquired from the Royals at last season’s trade deadline, is exactly the kind of overpriced light-hitting, slick-fielding shortstop the Astros should avoid.
Sanchez’s 2001 performance (.281/.300/.336) was not out of character with his career averages (.274/.311/.337). If that is what the Astros could expect from signing the 34-year-old Sanchez or someone like him, why not give Everett a season to see if he can hit big-league hurlers?
Some fans have suggested that the Astros seek to acquire Omar Vizquel from the Indians, who appear to be in a trading mood. For all his reputed greatness in the field, Vizquel had a poor season at the plate in 2001 (.255/.323/.334). If he could return to the kinds of performances he posted from 1996 to 2000 (.297/.369/.393), he would be a welcome addition to most teams. But a 34-year-old player like Vizquel is usually in decline, both offensively and defensively.
The possibility always exists that the Astros can make a mid-season trade to acquire somebody with more seasoning if Everett proves wholly incapable of success against major-league pitching. In the meantime, there is no reason to take out an insurance policy on him for $4 million or $5 million per year.
Truth in Center Fielding
The only real question in center field is when some fans will realize that Richard Hidalgo is not the defensive liability he is frequently made out to be. Baseball is immersed in stereotypes: the burly first baseman, the spry middle infielder, the squat catcher, the swift center fielder.
Hidalgo suffers from his failure to fit the stereotype of a “true” center fielder. He is not exceptionally fast. Last season he sported quite a few more pounds than his listed weight of 190. His cannon arm would be more valuable in right field. None of this means that Hidalgo is unfit for the job in center field, however.
Hidalgo’s defensive statistics were excellent in 2000 and in the middle of the pack in 2001. They indicate that he is by no means among the best defensive center fielders in the major leagues, but he is not among the worst, either.
Many folks choose to ignore defensive statistics entirely in favor of eyewitness observation. The problem with this is that most observers do not have the expertise to truly judge a fielder’s abilities. Effectiveness in center field involves more than speed, sure-handedness and acrobatics. It also demands smart positioning, reading the ball well off the bat and knowing one’s limits. It is doubtful that the vast majority of baseball audiences can accurately detect these skills.
Moreover, while most fans see their own team enough to get a feel for the defensive capabilities of its players, they see just a few games of most other players in the league. Only the most prolific experts witness enough baseball to compare players throughout the league with much reliability, and even then their eyewitness judgments are subjective.
The numbers add an objective element and are hence a useful addition to the other evidence. While fielding statistics have more biases than offensive and pitching statistics, they are not wholly worthless.
For example, defensive statistics show that players such as Bill Mazeroski and Ozzie Smith were great at their positions, just as they suggest that premier center fielders like Willie Mays, Richie Ashburn, Curt Flood and the DiMaggio brothers knew what they were doing. Defensive statistics also hint that Lance Berkman is poor in center field and that Berkman and Daryle Ward are spotty in the corner outfield.
Defensive statistics likewise support that Hidalgo is adequate in center field. The last two seasons Hidalgo has converted 89.2 percent of the balls hit to his defensive “zone” into outs, compared to a major-league average of 89.0 percent. Since 1998, Hidalgo has a conversion rate of 89.7 percent, compared with a major-league average of 88.7 percent. Perhaps losing some weight by spring training would return Hidalgo to his 2000 form, when he was much better than in 2001 at the plate and in the field.
That is Hidalgo’s job: turning balls into outs. His job is not to be fast, graceful, or smooth.
If the Astros could acquire a strong-hitting “true” center fielder, a prize like Carlos Beltran, 24, who was excellent for the Royals last season (.306/.362/.514), then moving Hidalgo would make sense. But seeking a “true” center fielder simply to have someone who fits a stereotype is silly.
Free-agent Johnny Damon has received the most mention of the “true” center fielders the Astros should pursue. Besides the fact that Damon might be looking for a “true” center-fielder contract of $8 million or more per year, he had a poor season with the Athletics in 2001 (.256/.324/.363), although his performance from 1998 to 2000 was better (.304/.367/.470). At 28, Damon is still in his prime. He is also a solid baserunner. He stole 27 bases in 39 attempts last season. Damon would give the Astros a “true” center fielder and a base-stealing threat.
Whether Damon fits the mold of a “true” center fielder better than Hidalgo is not the issue, however. The issue is whether the Astros would be better off overall. Given that Hidalgo would probably replace Ward as one of the Astros’ corner outfielders, and assuming Ward is a better hitter than Damon, the relevant questions are these:
1. How many more runs would an outfield of Berkman/Damon/Hidalgo prevent than an outfield of Ward/Hidalgo/Berkman?
2. How many more runs would Ward create at the plate than Damon?
3. What could the Astros acquire or retain with the difference in salary between Ward and Damon?
Answering these questions is by no means an exact science, but many fans do not even consider them in calling for the Astros to obtain someone like Damon or Juan Pierre of the Rockies. Acquiring a “true” center fielder would bolster the Astros up the middle and move Hidalgo and his fearsome arm to right field, but it would also remove Ward’s potentially devastating bat from the line-up. The money spent on Damon could be used to sign Berkman to a long-term contract, something in which the Astros have expressed an interest.
The Astros recently reacquired “true” center fielder Brian Hunter, who it is hoped will be no more than a defensive substitute and pinch runner in the late innings. Hunter posted one of his finest offensive performances for the Phillies last season (.276/.344/.359), but there is no reason to believe that at 31 Hunter will continue to deviate greatly from his subpar career averages (.264/.313/.342). At $2.2 million for two years, Hunter’s price is steep given how little he should be allowed to play, but keeping him out of the batter’s box ought to be a key task for new manager Jimy Williams.
It has also been suggested that acquiring a “true” center fielder would satisfy another vaunted stereotype, that of the “true” leadoff hitter. By far the most important role for a leadoff hitter, “true” or not, is reaching base. Here are the top three players in leadoff OBP in the National League the last five seasons:
2001 OBP ---------------- Biggio .378 LoDuca .378 Counsell .377
2000 OBP ---------------- Castillo .419 Biggio .413 Veras .404
1999 OBP ---------------- Henderson .417 Loretta .392 Biggio .386
1998 OBP ---------------- Benard .442 Biggio .403 Hamilton .396
1997 OBP ---------------- Santangelo .427 Biggio .418 Henderson .417
These are the active career leaders in leadoff OBP:
Active OBP --------------- Biggio .392 Stewart .369 Castillo .368
Biggio was also second in 1992 (.378) and first, leading off part-time, in 1994 (.446). In seasons when he has primarily batted leadoff, Biggio has only once in his carreer finished outside the top three in leadoff OBP, that exception being 1993, when he was sixth (.373). Biggio is quite simply one of the best leadoff hitters in baseball history. Whether he is a “true” leadoff hitter is irrelevant to this irrefutable fact. Yet it seems like every year somebody is looking for a reason to move Biggio to another slot in the order.
Bullpen
The Astros have made a bid to re-sign closer Billy Wagner, reportedly for three years at $20 million. Many fans question whether Wagner, 30, who pitched just 62-2/3 innings last season, should earn almost $7 million per season. An ace starter might earn twice as much as the Astros have offered Wagner. While a relief ace like Wagner pitches a quarter as many innings as an ace starter, a relief ace has a much smaller margin for error in the majority of his innings pitched.
A reliever of Wagner’s caliber turns in a higher quality of performance than a starter generally does. In 1999, Mike Hampton’s 2.90 ERA in 239 innings was about 42 earned runs better than the league ERA for starters of 4.48, while Wagner’s 1.57 ERA in 74-2/3 innings was about 21 earned runs better than the league ERA for relievers of 4.10. What Wagner lacked in quantity, he partly made up for in quality, saving half as many runs as a starter who pitched three times as many innings.
The salary offered to Wagner could be used to obtain a pair of quality middle relievers, assuming two quality middle relievers are available via trade or on the free-agent market. Relievers tend to be inconsistent, however, which is why a steady closer such as Wagner carries a premium price tag. Somebody like David Weathers might produce an ERA of 3.07 or 2.41, as he did the last two seasons, or he might end up at 4.65 or 4.91, as he did the two seasons before that. Other than an injury-plagued 2000, Wagner has kept his ERA under 3.00 since 1996.
If Wagner and the Astros cannot reach a deal, Wagner will either go to arbitration or be traded. Octavio Dotel could close, which should give the Astros leverage in dealing with Wagner, although it must be remembered that prior to Dotel’s sweet 2001 season (2.66, .205/.294/.294), he struggled mightily (5.39, .250/.346/.466) in 1999 and 2000. Before letting Wagner get away, the Astros want to be sure that last season was indicative of Dotel’s future.
Keeping Wagner in the fold would give the Astros a deadly right-left combination in the late innings. Whereas a team cannot make use of two quality shortstops or four quality outfielders, it can always use more quality relievers.
The Astros have re-signed Doug Brocail, who missed last season after elbow surgery. Brocail, 34, was unspectacular in 2000 (4.09, .285/.330/.460) but solid for the three years from 1998 to 2000 (2.99, .230/.289/.347). At $750,000, he might be a bargain.
Nelson Cruz, 29, returns after a middling season (4.15, .237/.310/.408) in which he was susceptible to the long ball. If Cruz is traded with Truby for Mike Myers, the Astros will get their long-coveted lefty specialist. Myers, 32, had a nice 2001 (3.60, .225/.339/.331) in which he even put up good numbers in Coors Field (3.65, .226/.347/.369). From 1998 to 2000 Myers also pitched well (3.23, .235/.330/.375). The Astros would like to complete this deal.
Hunsicker has stated that the Astros are seeking two more pitchers in the bullpen, perhaps from within the system. Redding struggled in his debut season (5.50, .286/.360/.507), and his 4.54 ERA at New Orleans was unimpressive. At 24, however, he might benefit from some major-league seasoning in middle relief. He did strike out 55 batters in 55-2/3 innings. They have fewer than 40 innings between them in the majors, but Linebrink (3.50), Stone (3.51), and Mann (2.52) pitched well in AAA.
Having three minor-leaguers in a position to compete for a bullpen role gives the Astros better odds of finding at least one of them suitable to pitch in the big leagues. If one of them fails in that role, the Astros can return him to New Orleans and bring up another one. Moreover, the Astros have more pitching talent deeper in the system that could surface before the end of the 2002 season. Signing or trading for a veteran offers the pro of bringing experience and a track record, but it also presents the con of wasting a roster spot if the pitcher fails to perform.
What the Astros hope to accomplish is something few teams pull off successfully: reloading a successful team with young players. Usually a young team is rebuilding, which is a euphemism for having virtually no chance of making the postseason. By keeping Bagwell and Biggio, and to a lesser extent Ausmus, Reynolds, and Wagner, as a foundation, the Astros have continued to contend as young stars like Hidalgo, Berkman, Oswalt and Miller blossom.
Things seldom go as planned. The deep, talented starting rotation the Astros anticipate could fall apart due to injuries or young pitchers not living up to their promise. Not all of the Astros in their mid-20s will prove to be viable major-leaguers. But having strength in numbers, with so many young players emerging at the same time, should result in at least a core group playing successfully. The bigger problem in three or four years, at least for owner Drayton McLane, will be paying their salaries. That is, assuming McLane is still in the awfully unprofitable business of baseball by that point.