Baserunning

Editor’s note – This article originally appeared on AstrosConnection.com.
Many fans and commentators believe there is no longer a place in baseball for baserunning as an offensive weapon.  As more and more teams pack their lineups with bulked-up sluggers, the conventional wisdom seems to be that baserunning skills no longer are needed and that aggressive baserunning is too risky and too low percentage in this era of the home run.  Taking the extra base when the opportunity arises, however, can enable a team to score on plays other than hits.  Intelligent baserunning can help a team compensate for a lack of speed and can complement a strong hitting team rather than detract from it.  Unfortunately, the 2001 Astros apparently do not believe this.

Think two bases
A team that wants to put pressure on opponents with its baserunning should adopt a “two base” approach.  A player using this approach will think “double” as he hits the ball.  He will come out of the box as quickly as possible on contact, sprint all the way to first base, and round the bag hard headed for second base.  This approach will enable the runner to take second on a slight bobble by an outfielder.  If the outfielder plays the hit cleanly, the hitter must stop quickly and hustle back to first.  Most important is running as hard as possible out of the box all the way around first to the point where the go or stop decision must be made; a hitter who merely strides or jogs into first will not be able to take the extra base on a slight misplay by an outfielder.
By thinking “two bases” on every play, the baserunner will believe he can go from first to third on every single, and he will believe he can score from second on any single to the outfield.  He cannot always do so, of course, but this two base approach will enable the third base coach to take a calculated risk with an outfielder’s arm at the appropriate time.  The runner must sprint from the base he is leaving to the next base, and he must come around that base hard as he gets the go or stop sign from the coach.  Equally important is no wasted steps.  The runner should not make wide turns, and to accomplish this, he should hit the inside corner of the base with his left foot and try to make as tight a turn as possible, with a crossover step with his right leg, as he rounds the bag.  If he does not sprint from the moment of contact until the coach stops him and does not make crisp, tight turns on his way to the next base, the result often will be station-to-station baseball:  runners moving up only one base at a time.  By not taking the extra base on a hit, the baserunner may require his teammates to get another hit to score the run.  Often this is difficult to accomplish against strong pitching.

Steal a base
Today’s teams do not emphasize the stolen base as a major part of their offensive attack.  Rickey Henderson is the last of the great base stealers of this era, and his legs are now too old and too tired for him to be a consistent threat to run.  A team does not have to have a Henderson or a Lou Brock or a Maury Wills to use the stolen base to augment its attack, however.  A steal is still the best way to advance a runner into scoring position without sacrificing an out, and intelligent baserunning can go a long way toward making up for a lack of sprinter’s speed on the basepaths.  Jeff Bagwell is the best example of this.  Never fast, he long has been among the most effective baserunners in the league.  He always seems to get a good jump, and his stolen bases are never unimportant or meaningless in the game’s context.  In addition, he is excellent at taking the extra base on hits to the outfield.  He is a textbook effective baserunner and is the model for an intelligent baserunning approach.

The lead
Most important is the lead.  Whether he is running or not, the baserunner should endeavor to take an aggressive, but not reckless, lead on every pitch.  His lead should be at the very edge of the margin between safe and out.  If he barely makes it back to the bag with a dive, the lead is perfect.  An obvious advantage of the maximum lead on each pitch is that it lessens the distance the runner must go to reach the next base safely.  In a game replete with situations in which split seconds are significant, an extra 1-2 feet of lead may be the sole difference in being safe.  Perhaps a less obvious benefit is that the baserunner does nothing different when he intends to steal if he takes the maximum safe lead on every pitch.  He is ready to run at any time without getting extra attention from the pitcher and catcher; this cuts down the risk of a pickoff or a pitchout merely because the defense has noticed a larger than normal lead.

The jump
Next in importance is a good jump on the pitcher’s delivery to the hitter.  Getting a quick break toward the next base is partly a matter of instinct and partly a matter of intense concentration and focus on the pitcher’s movements.  After checking the coach for a sign, the baserunner must watch the pitcher to the exclusion of everything else that is happening in the game.  He should be no more than two steps off the base while the pitcher is looking for the catcher’s sign, and then the runner should move into his lead as the pitcher stretches.  At all times, the runner must focus intently on the pitcher to determine whether he will throw to the plate or to the base.
For a runner at first base, the task is more difficult than if he were at second.  An old saying in baseball is that “it is much easier to steal third than second.”  The reasoning behind this axiom should be obvious:  the runner can get a larger lead off of second and the defenders are as far or farther from the base than he is.  At first base, the defender in most instances is standing at the bag to hold the runner as close to the base as possible.  At second base, the runner is in no greater danger if a lefthander is pitching, all pitchers must look in the opposite direction of the runner to begin a pitch, and a pickoff throw must combine stepping off the rubber and a 180? revolution of the pitcher’s body.  The danger of a successful pickoff throw is greater at first base so the runner there must concentrate more closely on the pitcher’s movements, especially when he intends to steal.

Help available
Against a righthanded pitcher, the task is relatively simple.  The righthanded pitcher cannot throw to first without balking unless he steps off the pitching rubber.  Thus, the most reliable part of his body to watch is his back foot.  If the pitcher raises his back heel as he starts out of the set position into his throwing motion, the runner should get back, aided (one hopes) by the first base coach’s shout of “BACK!”  The first base coach must watch the pitcher as intently as the baserunner must.  Another reliable indicator is the front shoulder of the righthanded pitcher.  If his shoulder closes as the pitcher starts out of the set position, he is making a pitch; if it opens up toward first as he starts out of the set position, he is committed to a pickoff throw.  Whichever key the runner uses to determine the pitcher’s intent, his focus must be narrow and intense so that he can start his break for second at the instant the righthanded pitcher begins his movement toward home plate.

Help needed
The task against a lefthanded pitcher is far more difficult.  Obviously, the lefthander is facing the baserunner at first base, rather than having his back to him, and there is a certain amount of intimidation he can accomplish merely by staring at the runner.  More important, the lefthanded pitcher does not show the runner where he is throwing the ball merely by starting into the throwing motion out of his set position, as does the righthanded pitcher.  If the lefthanded pitcher lifts his front knee straight up as he begins to throw, he can throw either to home or to first.  Only if his front foot breaks the plane of the pitching rubber and crosses it toward the outfield side is he committed to throwing a pitch.  If he lifts his knee straight up, he can throw to first at the last possible instant, with the only restriction being that his front foot must land on an imaginary line from the pitching rubber that is no less than 45?.  Umpires rarely enforce this balk rule, and for most good lefthanded pitchers, their A+ pickoff move is a “balk move.”
There is no reliable way to coach the runner at first against a good pickoff move by a lefthanded pitcher.  Stealing a base against the good move of a lefthander is a gamble every time.  The alert baserunner will watch the pitcher closely throughout the game to determine if he does anything differently on a throw to first.  Many lefthanded pitchers, in an effort to maximize their deception, will look toward first when they intend to throw home and will look toward home when they intend to throw to first, and thus they become predictable.  Some may make the really good, straight-up knee motion only when they will throw to first.  Others do not have a good move at all when throwing to first.  Only keen observation will discover a pitcher’s inadvertent indications of his intent.

Running on first movement
Finding such a tip will help the runner, of course, but stealing against the good lefthander is guesswork at best and risky at worst.  “Running on first movement” is a tactic that many managers and coaches use to eliminate the guesswork and the indecisiveness that inevitably results from not knowing what the lefthanded pitcher is about to do.  This tactic is self-explanatory:  the runner starts for second on the first movement of the front foot and knee out of the set position.  This is a gamble play and seeks to take advantage of most pitchers’ habit of deciding where they will throw the ball before they start out of the set position.  A lefthanded pitcher who can lift his front knee straight up, watch the runner, and then adjust into throwing to first if the runner breaks on first movement is death to the running game and will cause the coach to call off the “run on first movement” tactic.  The author speaks from painful personal experience on this point.

No wasted steps
There should be no wasted steps in the break toward the next base.  The first step should be a crossover step with the back foot rather than a half-step with the front foot.  On a steal, the runner should not look into the plate at the pitch.  He should put his head down and run as hard as he can on a straight line to the bag.  On a hit and run, the runner should look in to the plate to see what the hitter has done.  If the ball has been hit in the air, the runner must be ready to scramble back as quickly as possible to the base he left.
The runner must remember as he breaks for second on a steal attempt that he can and must abort the play if he slips or if he does not get a good jump on the pitcher.  To continue after a bad jump is an almost certain out, and the smart baserunner will stop his break after a bad jump and live to steal on another pitch.  He should continue after a bad jump on a hit and run because the purpose of that play is to put the runner in motion to make infielders move.  This tactic is for the hitter, not to steal a base.

The coaches
The first base coach is mainly a cheerleader, but he does have a couple of duties that aid the running game.  His telling the hitter to run on a ball hit in the gap is mostly ceremonial; the hitter should be thinking “double” on any ball he hits and should make the decision to advance to second largely on his observation of the fielders and the ball as he rounds first.  Taking second base will be automatic on a ball in the gap, and the most important coach on the extra base hit is the third base coach.  Important duties for the first base coach include helping his runner get back safely on pickoff throws, watching the first baseman playing behind the runner so that he does not sneak behind the runner at first, and, occasionally, stealing signs and relaying a signal to the hitter telling him what the next pitch will be.
In contrast to the relatively minor duties of the first base coach, the third base coach is an integral part of a good baserunning team.  He makes critical decisions whether to stop or send runners at second and at third, which decisions consist of his judgment aided by what he has learned watching the opponents play.  The third base coach should watch the opponent’s infield practice carefully to determine, as best he can, the strength and accuracy of outfielders’ throws to the various bases and of infielders’ cutoff relays.  This knowledge will assist him greatly when he must decide in an instant whether to send or to stop the runner who is seeking to move from first to third or attempting to score.

Use the coach
A baserunner must learn to use his third base coach and to ignore the ball in play as much as possible.  When going from first to third, the runner should look at the coach before he reaches second to see if he is telling him to go.  If so, after rounding the bag at full speed, he should again look to the coach for the go or stop sign.  Similarly, a runner at second must round third at full speed and look for the stop or go sign after coming around the base.  The third base coach should set up 15-20 feet or farther down the third base line toward home and should wait until the last moment to make the decision to hold the runner at third.  By bringing the runner around the bag at top speed, the coach enables the runner to score with no hesitation if the throw is late, weak or offline.  Winning teams practice baserunners’ rounding second and third at full speed while watching the coach, and they practice the sudden stop and the all out dash for the next base that the third base coach’s decisions require.

The decision to run
A manager, or head coach in high school and college baseball, must give the signs to get the running game in motion or they may give certain players the freedom to run on their own within whatever parameters the manager or coach thinks are prudent. Whether to allow a runner to attempt to steal a base is one of the most difficult decisions a manager has to make.  Many factors go into this decision:  the pitcher’s move to first, the pitcher’s ability to hold the runner close to the base, the catcher’s release and throwing ability, the score and situation of the game, the baserunner’s speed and ability to get a jump on the pitcher, the ability of the current hitter, the ability of the hitters who follow him, the count, and the types of pitches the current pitcher uses.
There is a constant guessing game going on between the manager and the opposing catcher. In a running situation, the manager wants to send the runner on a curve or some other off-speed pitch, and the catcher wants a fastball so that he will have more time in which to throw.  Most managers will watch the count and the pitcher’s tendencies closely to attempt to send the runner when a curve is likely.  A manager agonizes over this decision, especially when the run the baserunner represents is important, and he will curse the day he was born if a caught stealing eliminates a crucial run.  A great throwing catcher, like Brad Ausmus or Ivan Rodriguez, can take advantage of a manager’s insecurity about caught stealings and can virtually shut down a running game with the mere threat of throwing the runner out. A weak throwing catcher, such as Mitch Meluskey, will encourage an opposing manager to attempt an all-out running game.
Although the decision whether to give the steal sign is perhaps the most difficult for a manager, the decision whether to try to advance a runner from first to third or whether to try to score a runner is equally complex for the third base coach, and also is based on a number of variable factors.  A third base coach must consider the score of the game and the situation, the importance of the run, the arm of the outfielder, the arm of any potential cutoff man, the quickness and accuracy of the relay throw on an extra base hit, the speed of the runner, the runner’s position on the basepath when the outfielder or relay man is ready to throw, the ability of the next hitter, and the strength of the opposing pitcher and likely bullpen replacement.
The strength of the opponents’ pitching is especially important in high school and college baseball where the best pitchers often dominate the hitters.  A third base coach in that situation cannot count on consecutive hits to score a run, and he may be willing to take a chance by sending the runner home on the first hit his team gets with a runner in scoring position.  Aggressive, but not reckless, coaching and baserunning pays off in scoring extra runs over the course of a long season.  Station-to-station baseball is safer but will require at least one additional hit, or perhaps the 3-run homer, to score the runner who only advances a single base on a hit.
The manager or coach (and the fans) of a team that puts pressure on opponents with the running game must be prepared to accept that runners will be thrown out occasionally or will be picked off.  A team that uses the running game intelligently can be successful a high percentage of the time, and this ability to score runs with a minimum number of hits will augment the offense of a good hitting team rather than detract from it.  

Why don’t the Astros run?
The current emphasis on the home run has resulted in less emphasis on the running game throughout MLB, but that should not be an inevitable result.  The two styles of play can coexist.  The 2000 and 2001 Astros seem to be teams that have taken the either-or approach and that have chosen to swing away to try to put a number of hits together to score.  Stolen base attempts are rare, and the Astros’ manager does not often put runners in motion.  Apparently, Astros’ management, most likely Larry Dierker, has made a conscious decision to abandon the club’s traditional running game in favor of waiting on the home run to generate a big inning.  Whether this is a deliberate change of tactics or merely a reaction to changing personnel, there can be no doubt that the Astros no longer are a running team.
Many pundits blame the demise of the Astros’ running game on Enron Field. Perhaps a park that is more friendly to hitters may make a manager less likely to use his base stealers, but the park does not have to cause that result.  All hitters, even bulked-up sluggers, go into slumps, and a running game can enable a team that is not hitting to continue to score runs.  To score while in a slump requires attention to situational hitting, but, unfortunately, overdependence on slugging many times not only de-emphasizes the running game but also results in poor situational hitting.  The Astros seem to be a prime example of a team that no longer values situational hitting.  Maybe Larry Dierker has been seduced by his power-laden lineup or maybe he long has been a closet admirer of the Earl Weaver “wait for a 3-run home run” philosophy.  Either way, his lineup with its home run potential is the more likely explanation for the demise of the Astros’ running game than is the home ballpark.
Another possible explanation for the Astros’ failure to run is the changed personnel on the 2001 team. Although many of the names are the same, their circumstances and physical conditions are not.  All are older, of course, and Biggio, Alou and Bagwell have entered the stage of their baseball lives when losing a step is not uncommon.  Moreover, Alou, Hidalgo and Biggio have had serious leg injuries in recent years.  Any manager would be reluctant to have valuable players risk further injury by using them to implement a running game, and the injuries and subsequent rehabilitation also may have cost these players a step.  No doubt this risk of recurring injury is a significant factor in Dierker’s day-to-day decisions whether to have his key players run.
Finally, the team has not added players who appear to have excellent baserunning skills although most of the principles of smart baserunning can be taught and practiced.  Of the new players, only Barker and Lugo have real speed, and both have shown no better than average baserunning instincts.  Ward should never be used to run, unless he is part of a hit and run, and the manager has not shown any inclination to allow Berkman to run much either.  Berkman appears to have the skills to be a part of a running game, if given the opportunity.  Ausmus also could be a strong factor in a running game, but the manager must change his current philosophy first.
No less of an expert than the TalkZone’s own Arky Vaughan believes that the Astros’ current cautious approach to baserunning not only is attributable to the lineup of sluggers but also is the wisest tactical decision the team could make.  The lack of success of the Astros following the team’s decision to rely on hitting exclusively, if there was a conscious decision, seems to indicate otherwise.  Quite possibly, more consistent success will result if the Astros modify their approach to include:  putting runners in motion, allowing the base stealers the freedom to run or picking advantageous times to give a steal sign, emphasizing baserunning once again as an important part of the offense, stressing and teaching the fundamentals of baserunning, and placing a strong emphasis on situational hitting.
The power always will be present in the 2001 Astros’ lineup, but Dierker simply cannot count on, nor can he control, the hitters’ ability to hit the ball out of the park every day.  He can control the running game, and judicious use of the steal, the hit and run and the run and hit can maximize a team’s offense, even when it is in a slump.  Unfortunately, Larry Dierker merely gave a blanket green light when the team was running, and he appears neither inclined nor able to make the quick decisions required daily for an aggressive baserunning team.  
Because of the slugging lineup in 2001, real or perceived problems with the current personnel, and Dierker’s established preference for “let ’em play” baseball, Astros’ fans are unlikely to see a return to the days when the team played exciting baseball putting constant pressure on its opponents.  Nothing about Dierker has changed except that his green light is now red, and “let ’em play” means swing away and hope for three hits in a row or a home run.  This shift in emphasis is the fans’ loss and has not resulted in continued success for the team.  A return to intelligent baserunning as an offensive weapon is worth a try but is unlikely to occur during 2001.