Laying awake thinking of the most blissful time in my baseball memory takes me back to a season in the mid-’90s. Any one between 1994 and 1997 will do. There could be no better use of a summer vacation, before graduating into the real world and entering the work force, than sitting in the half-filled stands of the Astrodome.

For some reason, the image that pops to mind is always a day game, the seats emptier than normal. This adds a certain intimacy, the handful of fans who made it out to the game enjoying a secret pleasure that tens of thousands of other Houstonians are missing in person and millions of baseball fans nationwide can’t even see on TV, as if they would’ve watched anyway. And who cares whether they would?

Sitting a dozen rows behind third base in Section 242, the scene of Bagwell is always him giving no quarter charging a bunt with a total lack of concern for his own safety. Bagwell scoops up the ball just down the first-base line from home plate. He’s not in good position for a throw to second base, but somehow he somersaults head first and pops up firing, nailing the lead runner anyway.

It may have only happened once, but in my memory it occurs repeatedly. At the time, the reaction to seeing Bagwell’s glovework is to reflect on the fact that he used to play third base and still has a cannon attached to his shoulder. It’s a bitter twist of fate that that shoulder is what deprived him of finishing his career achieving his own milestone of 500 home runs. No doubt this bothers his fans more than it bothers Bagwell himself.

For Biggio, the mid-’90s memory is always of a late-inning rally with the Astros down by a run or two and the crowd chanting “Big-gi-o.” He invariably works the count then laces a double into the gap, clearing the bases and putting his club ahead for good.

Despite a difficult season in which he has struggled for weeks to bat .240, Thursday night was pure old-fashioned Biggio. He legged out two infield hits, including an 11th-inning, two-out, bases-empty single that made it possible for his next two teammates also to reach base and Carlos Lee to deposit a grand slam into the Crawford Boxes for an 8-5 victory.

Some baseball writers have criticized the Astros for playing the aging Biggio almost every day to help him reach 3,000 hits as well as sitting him out in Milwaukee so that he could eclipse the milestone at home. Don’t believe a word those people say.

If you were breathing the electric atmosphere at Minute Maid Park Thursday night then you have a far better understanding of what baseball means to the hometown fans than what it means to a few priggish curmudgeons rapping away at their keyboards thousands of miles away. Simply put, Thursday night was the most boisterous regular-season game in the eight years the stadium has been open. The fans in attendance got what they paid for. Anybody who doesn’t like it wasn’t forced to spend a dime to be there.

And who cares whether the national media put Biggio’s feat first, second or last in their coverage? This was a moment for Houston and its fans. Neither Biggio nor Bagwell has been about anything other than dedicating the excellence of their careers to the city of Houston and the Astros organziation. That they are only marginally or belatedly revered in the rest of the country is not our loss, but the loss of fans elsewhere who’ve missed something exceedingly rare and special for two decades.

Entering the game three hits shy of the mark, Biggio beat the odds with not just three, not just four but five hits. He also made Thursday the first time players have achieved their 3,000th hit and 500th home run on the same day. Frank Thomas had reached his milestone earlier in the day.

Bagwell and Thomas have always been linked, being born on the same day, winning MVP awards in 1994 and generally terrorizing the pitchers in their respective leagues. Moreover, at the end of 2005, when he played his last season, Bagwell stood at 449, with Thomas at 448, career home runs.

When Biggio made Bagwell, in street clothes, join him on the field to celebrate the moment, many fans must’ve ruminated that it could’ve been Bagwell, rather than Thomas, to reach 500 home runs Thursday. That ellusive fairy tale would’ve been the only way to make Thursday sweeter for Astros fans, but it was not to be.

The Astros will retire Bagwell’s No. 5 on Sunday, August 26. Biggio’s No. 7 will probably be placed on the wall above the left-field upper deck a year or two later. Biggio may stick around a little longer, perhaps playing part-time, assuming he hasn’t tired of dugouts, late-night plane rides and the rigors of putting his body on the line six months each summer.

He may cross the thresholds of 300 home runs, 700 doubles and 1,900 runs scored, although the chances aren’t great that he’ll play enough to get there. These are only numbers, and not particularly significant ones, anyway. At this point, they won’t enhance the greatness that we’ve had the thrill of enjoying for 20 seasons.

Which means that the day is fast approaching when neither Bagwell nor Biggio will be in an Astros uniform. That thought is bittersweet, although it surely beats the dismal recollections of watching Earl Campbell in a Saints jersey, Jose Cruz in a Yankees uniform, Nolan Ryan taking the mound for the Rangers or Hakeem Olajuwon tipping off for the Raptors to finish their careers. In any event, Bagwell and Biggio will almost certainly be reunited in Cooperstown.

And then only memories, like those days in the mid-’90s in the Astrodome, will remain. If a whispering voice ever tells me to clear a cornfield to build a baseball diamond, that’s what I plan on watching, eternally. It will be a hallowed place where Bagwell’s throws will always streak just in time to the target, and Biggio’s doubles will always find the gap.

In 2006, Jennings ranked 12th in the National League with a 3.78 ERA. He also finished 15th with a .258 batting average allowed, 21st with a .329 OBP allowed and ninth with a .386 slugging percentage allowed.

In fact, although Oswalt led the league with a 2.98 ERA, eight-tenths of an earned run better than Jennings, they were not so different when it came to some other categories:

Pitcher    Avg   OBP   Slg   OPS
--------------------------------
Oswalt    .263  .299  .403  .702
Jennings  .258  .329  .386  .715

While Jennings held opponents to fewer hits per at-bat, he issued a lot more walks, but he also held them to fewer total bases per at-bat. Here?s the same breakdown on a per-nine-innings basis:

Pitcher   H/9  BB/9  BR/9  2B/9  3B/9  HR/9  TB/9
-------------------------------------------------
Oswalt    9.0   1.6  10.8  2.24  0.16  0.73  13.7
Jennings  8.8   3.6  12.5  1.53  0.34  0.72  13.1

Jennings allowed fewer hits, fewer home runs and fewer total bases. He did walk two more batters per nine innings, and perhaps that explains the considerable difference in ERA. But maybe not all the difference.

Jennings had a similar discrepancy in the split between his statistics at home and away in 2006:

Split  H/9  BB/9  BR/9  2B/9  3B/9  HR/9  TB/9   Avg   OBP   Slg   OPS
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Home   8.8   4.0  12.8  0.98  0.27  0.80  12.7  .262  .339  .378  .717
Away   8.7   3.2  12.2  2.03  0.41  0.65  13.5  .254  .320  .393  .713

Jennings was better at keeping runners off base and surrendering the long ball on the road, although he got tagged for fewer doubles and triples, and hence fewer total bases, at home. Summing all that up, his home OPS and road OPS were virtually identical.

But his ERA was better at home by half a run, 3.56 to 3.97. These are not the only examples of a disconnect between Jennings’ ERA and his peripheral pitching statistics.

Although Jennings had an outstanding 2006, the previous season he yielded a 5.02 ERA. Part of that is explained by pitching precisely half his starts and innings at Coors Field prior to the humidor. Jennings had 10 games started and 61 innings pitched both at home and away in 2005.

His home and away splits in 2005 were similarly quirky to those in 2006:

Split   H/9  BB/9  BR/9  2B/9  3B/9  HR/9  TB/9   Avg   OBP   Slg   OPS
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Home   11.2   4.6  16.1  2.51  0.00  0.74  15.9  .308  .388  .437  .825
Away    8.0   4.6  13.0  2.21  0.15  0.89  13.1  .237  .333  .390  .723

With that 102-point difference in OPS, you might think Jennings allowed far fewer earned runs on the road than at home. The actual difference was just two earned runs, for a 5.16 ERA at home and a 4.87 ERA away. In other words, at home he allowed 21 more hits, 19 more total bases, the same number of walks and one fewer hit batsmen, but surrendered just two more earned runs.

What’s the point of raising this? For one thing, it may indicate that Jennings really was about as good a pitcher in 2005 as he was in 2006, and that may mean that the chances are better that he can turn in a comparable performance in 2007.

Comparing his away statistics for the past two seasons, it’s not apparent that Jennings really was that much different in 2006 than he was in 2005 away from Coors Field:

Split   H/9  BB/9  BR/9  2B/9  3B/9  HR/9  TB/9   Avg   OBP   Slg   OPS
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
2005    8.0   4.6  13.0  2.21  0.15  0.89  13.1  .237  .333  .390  .723
2006    8.7   3.2  12.2  2.03  0.41  0.65  13.5  .254  .320  .393  .713

Jennings had a 4.87 road ERA in 2005 in contrast to his 3.97 road ERA in 2006. That huge difference in ERA masks the fact that in 2005 on the road, Jennings allowed fewer hits and total bases, although he did walk more batters, than in 2006 on the road.

There are a few reasons why a pitcher’s earned runs allowed might not synchronize with his hits, total bases and walks allowed.

First, if you have two pitchers yielding 10 baserunners per game, the pitcher who tends to scatter baserunners throughout the game should be more likely to have a lower ERA than the pitcher who has the habit of allowing baserunners in bunches. Second, a starting pitcher’s ERA may be affected by the performance of his bullpen in stranding inherited runners or permitting them to score.

Third, while a pitcher’s ERA doesn’t reflect events that contribute to unearned runs, his OPS allowed will incorporate every hit, walk and total base surrendered by the pitcher. Finally, there’s simply random chance, or luck. There’s no statistical rule that says the same number of baserunners and total bases, even when equally distributed, must result in the same number of earned runs.

Just as a team’s OPS is closely correlated to its runs scored, a pitcher’s OPS allowed bears a tight relationship with his ERA. For all starting pitchers with at least 162 innings pitched in a season from 2000 to 2006 (a sample of 588 pitcher seasons), ERA’s correlation was 0.75 with batting average, 0.78 with OBP, 0.84 with slugging percentage and 0.89 with OPS. A perfect correlation is 1.00, so the 0.89 correlation between ERA and OPS allowed is a very strong relationship.

From that same sample of pitchers, 37 of them allowed an OPS between .713 (Jennings’ 2006 road OPS) and .723 (Jennings? 2005 road OPS). Their ERAs ranged from 3.09 to 4.47. For the group, the average OPS was .717, while the average ERA was 3.86. So Jennings’ 3.97 road ERA in 2006 is a little bit higher than what one might expect given his .713 OPS allowed, and his 4.87 road ERA in 2005 was a lot higher than what one might expect given his .723 OPS allowed.

Moreover, if you take the 50 pitchers in the sample group with an ERA between 3.87 and 4.07, i.e., clustered around Jennings’ 2006 road ERA of 3.97, only 15 of them were better than Jennings’ .713 road OPS allowed in 2006, and the average OPS for the group was .733.

Even more drastic, if you take the 41 pitchers in the sample group with an ERA between 4.77 and 4.97, i.e., clustered around Jennings’ 2005 road ERA of 4.87, none of them was better than Jennings’ .723 road OPS allowed in 2005, and the averages for the group are nowhere near as good as Jennings’ peripheral numbers:

Split      ERA  H/9  BB/9  BR/9  2B/9  3B/9  HR/9  TB/9   Avg   OBP   Slg   OPS
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jennings  4.87  8.0   4.6  13.0  2.21  0.15  0.89  13.1  .237  .333  .390  .723
Average   4.86  9.7   3.0  13.1  1.98  0.24  1.24  15.9  .275  .337  .451  .788

Other than ERA (and walks), Jennings’s statistics were distinctly better than the sample group’s average. It seems pretty unlikely that a pitcher posting the kinds of numbers Jennings did would have an ERA as high as the sample group’s average.

Which doesn’t mean the same thing can’t happen again. Sometimes lightning strikes twice or even three or four times. But the discrepancies do suggest that Jennings’ 2005 performance on the road was more akin to the fine numbers he produced in 2006 on the road and in a humidor-affected Coors Field than his ERAs indicate. Simply put, Jennings was possibly a better pitcher in 2005 than you think, somewhere close to what he was in 2006.

Maybe it’s just wishful thinking, but here’s to hoping that translates into a successful performance by Jennings for the 2007 Astros.

Some upgrades to the line-up in 2006, including a full season of a healthy Lance Berkman and adding Preston Wilson in the outfield, were expected to result in a better offensive performance, but the Astros have seen some regression in other areas.

One way to evaluate the ups and downs is to estimate the number of runs created by players at each position. The simplest way to estimate runs created is as follows:

(On-Base Percentage * Slugging Percentage) / At-Bats

While not as sophisticated as other models, for the 2006 National League, this equation estimates actual runs scored with an average error of about 3 percent.

For example, the 2006 Astros have a .330 OBP, .401 slugging percentage and 3,303 at-bats, resulting in an estimated 437 runs created. The Astros have actually scored 436 runs. The equation seldom yields an estimate this precise, but it gets close enough for a useful comparison.

The figures below are based on the 2005 and 2006 OBPs and slugging percentages for Astros players, based on their number of at-bats thus far this season.

Catchers: +2

Year   Avg   OBP   Slg   OPS  RC
--------------------------------
2005  .238  .316  .315  .631  35
2006  .242  .310  .335  .645  37

Astros catchers have been more or less a wash at the plate between 2005 and 2006. Brad Ausmus, after a rough first half in 2005, had a nice finish:

Split         Avg   OBP   Slg   OPS  RC
---------------------------------------
First Half   .241  .327  .294  .621  18
Second Half  .275  .373  .365  .738  27

This season, Ausmus started off hot in April but has suffered a dramatic decline at the plate since then:

Split      Avg   OBP   Slg   OPS  RC
------------------------------------
April     .339  .462  .387  .849  11
May-July  .215  .255  .278  .532  15

Overall in 2006, Ausmus has been less productive than in 2005, given the same number of at-bats:

Year   Avg   OBP   Slg   OPS  RC
--------------------------------
2005  .258  .351  .331  .682  32
2006  .244  .308  .303  .611  25

Meanwhile, whatever defensive liabilities Eric Munson has presented this season, he has been an improvement at the plate over what Raul Chavez and Humberto Quintero provided in 2005:

Player                 Avg   OBP   Slg   OPS  RC
------------------------------------------------
2005 Chavez-Quintero  .176  .208  .261  .469   8
2006 Munson           .215  .303  .374  .677  12

That difference is even starker given that Chavez and Quintero created an estimated four fewer runs despite having 46 more at-bats.

First Basemen: +19

Year   Avg   OBP   Slg   OPS  RC
--------------------------------
2005  .266  .363  .461  .824  65
2006  .319  .382  .570  .952  84

As one would expect, replacing the injured Jeff Bagwell and a revolving door at first base last season with Berkman and Mike Lamb sharing time in 2006 has produced distinctly superior offensive results. Production by Astros first basemen for the 2005 season was shared as follows:

Player    Avg   OBP   Slg    OPS  RC
------------------------------------
Berkman  .317  .440  .567  1.007  75
Lamb     .204  .243  .361   .604  17
Bagwell  .250  .361  .398   .759  13

With Berkman spending more time in right field this season, the split with Lamb at first base is a bit closer to even:

Player    Avg   OBP   Slg   OPS  RC
-----------------------------------
Berkman  .307  .375  .578  .952  47
Lamb     .342  .399  .578  .977  37

Lamb?s resurgence has helped bring about an estimated 19-run turnaround at first base, the biggest increase for the Astros at any position in 2006. Lamb has been a key difference-maker offensively for the 2006 Astros. Here is Lamb?s improvement from 2005 to 2006, inclusive of all positions played, based on the same number of at-bats:

Year   Avg   OBP   Slg   OPS  RC
--------------------------------
2005  .236  .284  .419  .703  27
2006  .319  .369  .511  .880  43

Second Basemen: -11

Year   Avg   OBP   Slg   OPS  RC
--------------------------------
2005  .267  .326  .469  .795  62
2006  .252  .321  .395  .716  51

The Astros have seen a loss of an estimated 11 runs created out of their second baseman at the plate in 2006. Last season was mostly Craig Biggio at second base. A decrease in slugging percentage has seen Biggio?s estimated runs created drop, given the same number of at-bats:

Year   Avg   OBP   Slg   OPS  RC
--------------------------------
2005  .264  .325  .468  .792  52
2006  .262  .327  .417  .744  47

Others at second base have also been even less productive in 2006 (mostly Chris Burke and Eric Bruntlett) than in 2005 (mostly Jose Vizcaino, Burke and Bruntlett), given the same number of at-bats:

Year   Avg   OBP   Slg   OPS  RC
--------------------------------
2005  .245  .288  .378  .666  10
2006  .204  .275  .269  .543   7

Thus, the decline at second base has been a group effort and not merely a result of Biggio?s aging.

Third Basemen: -13

Year   Avg   OBP   Slg   OPS  RC
--------------------------------
2005  .283  .384  .548  .932  74
2006  .237  .370  .466  .836  61

Morgan Ensberg might have been due to cool off, but few people expected his batting average to wind up so low and his power to short out a month or two into the season. Nonetheless, Ensberg?s 2006 demise has not been as great, compared to 2005, as fans might guess, given the same number of at-bats:

Year   Avg   OBP   Slg   OPS  RC
--------------------------------
2005  .283  .388  .557  .945  60
2006  .236  .390  .500  .890  54

If Ensberg comes back from injury, he might be able to close some of the gap. Meanwhile, Ensberg?s subs in 2005 (mostly Lamb and Vizcaino, after Lamb got hot), were markedly better than his 2006 replacements have been (mostly Lamb when he was not so hot and Huff), given the same number of at-bats:

Year   Avg   OBP   Slg   OPS  RC
--------------------------------
2005  .288  .365  .485  .850  14
2006  .235  .295  .333  .629   8

So while third base has represented a loss of an estimated 13 runs created from 2005 to 2006, only about half of that has been Ensberg. The other half has been his back-ups.

Shortstops: -1

Year   Avg   OBP   Slg   OPS  RC
--------------------------------
2005  .241  .284  .352  .636  35
2006  .241  .302  .325  .627  34

Like catcher, shortstop has been more or less even for the Astros between 2005 and 2006. Adam Everett has been a little worse at the plate in 2006 than in 2005:

Year   Avg   OBP   Slg   OPS  RC
--------------------------------
2005  .248  .290  .364  .654  32
2006  .238  .296  .325  .620  29

Others at shortstop in 2006 (Bruntlett and Burke) have yielded slightly higher runs created estimates than their 2005 counterparts (Vizcaino and Bruntlett):

Year   Avg   OBP   Slg   OPS  RC
--------------------------------
2005  .194  .254  .258  .512   3
2006  .260  .351  .340  .691   6

So the setback to Everett has been mostly alleviated by his subs.

Left Fielders: +6

Year   Avg   OBP   Slg   OPS  RC
--------------------------------
2005  .244  .310  .388  .698  47
2006  .281  .320  .421  .741  53

Wilson was expected to bring stability to left field this season, which he has. The Astros have seen an improvement of an estimated six runs created, based on the same number of at-bats out of their left fielders.

In 2005, the Astros wrote nine different left fielders onto the line-up card, none of whom logged a majority of the plate appearances at the position. (They were Burke, Berkman, Orlando Palmeiro, Luke Scott, Lamb, Jason Lane, Todd Self, Charles Gipson and Bruntlett.) The 2006 Astros have featured seven different left fielders (Wilson, Burke, Palmeiro, Bruntlett, Scott, Berkman and Lane), but Wilson has gotten the vast majority of the playing time.

As written previously, Wilson?s 2006 performance is not significantly different than his production from 2003 to 2005 outside Coors Field, given the same number of at-bats:

Year        Avg   OBP   Slg   OPS  RC
-------------------------------------
2003-2005  .251  .315  .444  .759  50
2006       .277  .314  .422  .736  47

The Astros might have expected a bit more power out of Wilson, particularly in Minute Maid Park, but overall the Astros have gotten what they should have expected from their free-agent left fielder.

Center Fielders: +2

Year   Avg   OBP   Slg   OPS  RC
--------------------------------
2005  .293  .332  .372  .704  49
2006  .277  .340  .379  .719  51

Center field has also been fairly consistent for the Astros season on season, given the same number of at-bats. A significant turnaround has been Willy Taveras, whose offense has suffered from 2005 to 2006, given equal at-bats:

Year   Avg   OBP   Slg   OPS  RC
--------------------------------
2005  .291  .325  .341  .666  34
2006  .257  .308  .309  .618  29

Burke has taken up the slack, however, most often starting in place of Taveras in center field. Here is Burke compared in 2005 and 2006, at all positions played, based on the same number of at-bats:

Year   Avg   OBP   Slg   OPS  RC
--------------------------------
2005  .248  .309  .368  .676  24  
2006  .290  .371  .488  .859  38

Burke?s improvement and replacement of Taveras has resulted in a net increase in estimated runs created from Astros center fielders in 2006, and Burke, along with Lamb, has been among the most pleasant surprises for the 2006 club.

Right Fielders: +9

Year   Avg   OBP   Slg   OPS  RC
--------------------------------
2005  .264  .317  .470  .787  52
2006  .256  .372  .470  .842  61

Of all the Astros, the position player suffering arguably the biggest collapse has been Jason Lane. Lane had a decent if unremarkable 2005, while 2006 turned into a nightmare. Here is the comparison, with equal numbers of at-bats:

Year   Avg   OBP   Slg   OPS  RC
--------------------------------
2005  .267  .316  .499  .815  35
2006  .205  .330  .393  .722  29

That drop-off, which landed Lane back in the minors, has been overcome by putting Berkman in left field and Lamb at first base. This amounts to a switch of Lamb for Lane, which is a helpful move, at least offensively.

Speaking of Berkman, here is a comparison of 2005 and 2006, based on the same number of at-bats, at all positions played:

Year   Avg   OBP   Slg   OPS  RC
--------------------------------
2005  .293  .411  .524  .934  71
2006  .317  .403  .595  .998  79

Among National Leaguers, Berkman ranks 11th in batting average, ninth in OBP, third in slugging percentage, second in OPS and third in runs created. He is simply one of the best hitters in baseball and is the most valuable asset the Astros have.

Pitchers: -3

Year   Avg   OBP   Slg   OPS  RC
--------------------------------
2005  .169  .208  .199  .407   6
2006  .103  .157  .128  .285   3

For whatever reason, in 2006 Astros pitchers have been even more abysmal than one would normally expect. Fortunately, the effects have been almost negligible, an estimated three runs created.

Pinch Hitters: -6

Year   Avg   OBP   Slg   OPS  RC
--------------------------------
2005  .252  .320  .394  .714  16
2006  .198  .285  .286  .571  10

Astros pinch hitters have also performed extremely poorly in 2006, resulting in a decline of an estimated six runs created from 2005, given the same number of at-bats. A big part of this has been that Palmeiro, who has as many pinch at-bats as any four other Astros combined, has had a calamitous decline:

Year   Avg   OBP   Slg   OPS  RC
--------------------------------
2005  .284  .341  .431  .772  11
2006  .219  .288  .260  .548   6

Designated Hitters: +4

Year   Avg   OBP   Slg   OPS  RC
--------------------------------
2005  .143  .231  .171  .402   1
2006  .270  .357  .378  .735   5

In their interleague games, the Astros have at least made more of the designated hitter in 2006 than they did in 2005, resulting in a net gain of an estimated four runs created.

Summary

To sum up the year-on-year changes by position:

Pos  2005  2006  Change
-----------------------
C      35    37      +2
1B     65    84     +19
2B     62    51     -11
3B     74    61     -13
SS     35    34      -1
LF     47    53      +6
CF     49    51      +2
RF     52    61      +9
P       6     3      -3
PH     16    10      -6
DH      5     1      +4

That puts the 2006 Astros a bit ahead of the 2005 Astros offensively. The downturns by Ausmus, Biggio, Ensberg, Taveras, Lane and Palmeiro have been more than offset by the improvements by Berkman, Lamb and Burke, as well as the additions of Munson and Wilson, at least through the first three-fifths of the season.

But a club languishing next-to-last in its league in scoring is going to have a tough time making the playoffs. Pitching and defense may be keys to winning, but a team that cannot put runs on the scoreboard regularly enough will not survive by pitching and defense alone.

 Avg   OBP   Slg   OPS    G   AB    H  2B  3B  HR   R  RBI  BB
--------------------------------------------------------------  
.283  .321  .422  .742   85  332   94  18   2   9  34   47  18

That projects for the full season to the following:

 Avg   OBP   Slg   OPS    G   AB    H  2B  3B  HR   R  RBI  BB
--------------------------------------------------------------  
.283  .321  .422  .742  157  613  174  33   4  15  63   87  33

If you compare that to Wilson’s track record, it’s amazingly similar to what he’s done in the past. An earlier column discussed what Wilson did from 2003 to 2005, excluding his Coors Field numbers. Here are those numbers again:

 Avg   OBP   Slg   OPS    G   AB    H  2B  3B  HR   R  RBI  BB
--------------------------------------------------------------  
.251  .315  .444  .759  157  613  154  35   1  27  75   75  61

Wilson’s power numbers are less than one might expect, but he’s hitting for a higher average. That’s a trade-off of just 12 total bases. He’s walking less this season, though, which is why his OBP is only slightly higher despite the big jump in batting average.

Also, in 2006, Wilson is scoring runs at a lower rate but driving them in at a higher rate. If you add his runs and RBI together, it’s 150 in both his 2006 projected numbers and his earlier performance.

Wilson’s track record also suggested that he might create an estimated 86 runs in 613 at-bats. His current pace projects to an estimated 83 runs created, almost right on target.

Of course, a midseason projection does not necessarily accurately foretell what Wilson’s final 2006 numbers will look like, particularly given that Wilson has been up and down thus far this season:

Month   Avg   OBP   Slg   OPS  HR   R  RBI
------------------------------------------
April  .231  .276  .407  .683   5  13   11
May    .295  .327  .362  .689   0   8   15
June   .337  .364  .505  .869   3   9   16
July   .243  .317  .432  .749   0   4    4

Since an awful April, Wilson is batting .303 with a .341 OBP, .424 slugging percentage and .765 OPS. If he maintains something close to that pace, Wilson might even beat what he’s done the last three seasons.

There has been some discussion of Wilson’s performance in the clutch. The numbers below demonstrate that Wilson’s has generally hit well with runs on base and in scoring position, although the majority of his home runs have been solo shots, and he has not performed all that well in the late innings of close games:

Situation        Avg   OBP   Slg   OPS   AB   H  HR  RBI
--------------------------------------------------------
None On         .277  .311  .424  .735  184  51   6    6
Runners On      .292  .335  .424  .759  144  42   2   40
RISP            .304  .343  .424  .767   92  28   0   36
RISP, 2 Outs    .311  .380  .467  .847   45  14   0    5
Close and Late  .261  .271  .326  .597   46  12   1   18

An earlier column also discussed that during the offseason, the Astros, Cardinals and Cubs all made similar acquisitions of mid-grade outfielders, with the Astros signing Wilson, the Cubs Jacque Jones and the Cardinals Juan Encarnacion. Here’s a side-by-side comparison of what they’ve done in 2006:

Player        Avg   OBP   Slg   OPS   G  2B  3B  HR   R  RBI  BB
----------------------------------------------------------------
Wilson       .283  .321  .422  .743  85  18   2   8  34   47  18
Jones        .306  .336  .528  .864  81  19   0  15  37   45  12
Encarnacion  .273  .304  .447  .751  84  15   4  11  43   46  13

The Cubs have gotten the best deal so far, not that it has mattered much since they’re on pace to lose almost 100 games. Meanwhile, Wilson and Encarnacion have been extremely comparable.

Overall, the Astros seem to have gotten what they bargained for with Wilson. Besides his decent bat, he appears to have developed well at playing Minute Maid Park’s quirky left field. A disappointing start out of the gate for Wilson has quietly turned into a solid acquisition by general manager Tim Purpura.

While signing Preston Wilson may not have been a blockbuster move, and although the Astros made no other significant additions, Houston nonetheless has reason to hope for better fortunes at the plate this season. Two sets of figures in particular tell why. Here they are:

Pos   Avg   OBP   Slg  2B  3B  HR   R  RBI   BB   RC
----------------------------------------------------
1B   .266  .363  .461  33   1  28  92  101   93  102
LF   .244  .310  .388  34   6  14  71   57   53   74

These are the performances by Astros first basemen and left fielders, cumulatively, in 2005. That last column is runs created and is a simple estimate (OBP times slugging percentage times at-bats) of how many runs the player or players generated offensively.

Astros first basemen were 11th in batting average, seventh in OBP and home runs, eighth in slugging percentage and RBI, fifth in runs and sixth in runs created among National League teams ? a middling performance. Meanwhile, Astros left fielders were 15th in batting average, OBP, slugging average, RBI and runs created and 14th in home runs and runs among National League teams ? among the worst in baseball.

First base last season was a combination of four players:

Player          PA   Avg   OBP   Slg
------------------------------------
Lance Berkman  368  .317  .440  .567
Mike Lamb      202  .204  .243  .361
Jeff Bagwell   108  .250  .361  .398
Jose Vizcaino   32  .200  .250  .233

Only Lance Berkman performed at a level a team would hope to get from perhaps its most important generator of run production. The likely career-ending resolution of Jeff Bagwell?s situation at least has the silver lining of giving the Astros a chance to gain significantly from what should be their biggest source of offensive output.

The Astros got an estimated 102 runs created out of first base last season. Trade that .363 OBP and .461 slugging percentage for Berkman?s .425 OBP and .535 slugging percentage over the last three seasons, and that translates into an estimated 139 runs created in 609 at-bats, or almost 40 more than Astros first basemen produced in 2005.

Left field was an even more motley assortment, with nine different players seeing action:

Player             PA   Avg   OBP   Slg
---------------------------------------
Chris Burke       302  .253  .312  .375
Lance Berkman     142  .231  .345  .405
Orlando Palmeiro   83  .293  .354  .427
Luke Scott         71  .167  .225  .242
Mike Lamb          46  .279  .304  .535
Jason Lane         12  .250  .250  .500
Todd Self           9  .333  .333  .444
Charles Gipson     10  .000  .000  .000
Eric Bruntlett      9  .250  .333  .750

Among that gang, nobody was particularly spectacular. Berkman?s time was spent there right after coming off the disabled list. Orlando Palmeiro was a solid performer, but for only a fraction of plate appearances.

Enter Wilson. His averages over the last three seasons give an idea of what he might provide the Astros in 2006:

Split       Avg   OBP   Slg    AB  2B  3B  HR    R  RBI   BB
------------------------------------------------------------
Total      .268  .332  .487  1322  83   3  67  191  260  116
Coors      .289  .357  .542   581  41   2  34  100  138   55
Elsewhere  .251  .315  .444   741  42   1  33   91  122   61

Even with more modest numbers outside Coors Field, Wilson?s .315 OBP and .444 slugging percentage suggest an estimated 86 runs created in 613 at-bats, or a dozen more than the Astros got out of their left fielders last season.

And while Wilson?s three-year averages should be viewed in light of the effects of the significant time he played in Coors, it should be noted that his other home park for almost half a season, RFK Stadium, was particularly brutal on Wilson.

A dozen runs may not sound like a lot ? just an extra run every 14 games ? but for a team that often struggled to score at all last season, any addition helps. And the estimate for Wilson is conservative ? it does not consider whether he might see better numbers in Minute Maid Park than he did mostly on the road the last three years.

Of course, Berkman and Wilson probably will not play every game at first base and left field. But even if Mike Lamb takes some throws at first and Chris Burke and Palmeiro shag some flies in left, the lion?s share of playing time will belong to Berkman and Wilson, absent injury, and that should bring stability and added productivity to both positions this year.

The Astros also have to worry about whether they can rely on comparable performances at other positions in 2006. They might lose a little at second base (101 RC), as Craig Biggio ages, and third base (124 RC), as Morgan Ensberg comes off a breakout season. But then Willy Taveras in center field (83 RC) and Jason Lane in right field (93 RC) each now have a season under their belts as full-time players.

At catcher (53 RC), Brad Ausmus might tail off after a slight resurgence in 2005, but, at shortstop (61 RC), Adam Everett has almost nowhere else to go but up, particularly with a worrisome family problem (surgery on his infant daughter) behind him.

And there is the benefit manager Phil Garner will enjoy of not having to pencil his bench players (pinch-hitters, 29 RC) so often into the starting line-up this season, giving him added flexibility late in games.

If these eventualities at other positions balance out, and if Berkman and Wilson put up numbers that result in extra output on the magnitude described above (admittedly, neither of those are a given), the Astros might find themselves more formidable offensively. An extra 50 runs last season would have put them fifth, rather than 11th, in the National League in scoring. It also might have given them five or six more wins, making that final stretch in September less nerve-wracking.

To expect that in 2006 may be wishful thinking, but it sure beats having no reason to be hopeful for improvement. Pitching is another matter, dependent largely on whether the best pitcher born since 1900 decides to take another turn in the rotation.

Running a baseball team involves a lot of moving parts. Fixing one problem often means creating another. One thing the Astros have not had to worry about for the last 15 years is filling out the line-up card at first base.

Thanks to Lance Berkman, that should continue not to be a problem for awhile. But for the last decade and a half, Jeff Bagwell was the constant that made first base the cornerstone of a perennially contending franchise.

In baseball, consistency commands a premium. Free agents come and go. Players break out for a season or two then plummet back to earth. Injuries bore holes into otherwise formidable line-ups.

Many of the descriptors that reflect Bagwell’s greatness as a player are well known. Rookie of the year in 1991. Unanimous MVP in 1994. Four-time all-star.

From 1991 to 2004, Bagwell was the starting first baseman for the Astros. He appeared at that position in 2,087 of the team’s 2,203 games in those 14 seasons.

But durability alone is not enough for consistency. Cal Ripken sometimes batted .320 and sometimes batted .250. What the Astros got from Bagwell was a reliability of quality almost unmatched in recent times. It seemed like season after season of 30 home runs, 100 runs, 100 RBI, 100 walks.

To understand what it is to be consistent, consider another point of view, looking at the National League from 1991 to 2004, team by team, position by position. Here are all National League teams in production from the first base position, averaged from 1991 to 2004:

Team           Avg   OBP   Slg   OPS  HR    R  RBI   BB   RC
------------------------------------------------------------
Rockies       .326  .400  .590  .990  36  114  123   73  143
Astros        .295  .400  .535  .935  33  112  112  102  127
Cardinals     .282  .367  .499  .866  32   93  103   80  112
Brewers       .273  .357  .476  .832  29   92  103   80  105
Cubs          .292  .373  .456  .829  18   88   90   78  103
------------------------------------------------------------
Padres        .275  .361  .463  .824  25   83   98   80   99
Diamondbacks  .282  .362  .460  .822  23   88   94   77  103
Braves        .279  .348  .473  .821  26   81   98   63   98
Reds          .292  .357  .449  .806  18   85   88   62   99
Phillies      .274  .352  .453  .805  22   88   94   72   97
------------------------------------------------------------
Mets          .277  .357  .442  .799  20   79   88   74   95
Giants        .273  .348  .447  .795  22   83   95   69   94
Florida       .266  .338  .447  .785  23   79   89   64   90
Dodgers       .264  .325  .445  .770  26   77   95   55   88
Pirates       .256  .325  .430  .755  21   83   88   61   85
------------------------------------------------------------
Expos         .259  .330  .423  .752  19   78   81   62   84

Only the Rockies enjoyed more production at first base over that span (which began in 1993 for Colorado). As one would expect, however, the park effects in Colorado were significant:

Team     Split   Avg   OBP   Slg   OPS   HR   R   RBI   BB
----------------------------------------------------------
Rockies  Home   .311  .375  .515  .890  116  517  491  285
Rockies  Away   .258  .326  .407  .733   77  347  328  265

(Figures are season averages of the Rockies and their opponents combined.)

Given that the Rockies enjoyed an advantage of 53 points of batting average, 49 points of OBP and 108 points of slugging average in Colorado, the gap between the Rockies and Astros does not seem as significant. The Astros played in an environment that was neutral, or slightly favorable to pitchers, from 1991 to 2004:

Team     Split   Avg   OBP   Slg   OPS   HR   R   RBI   BB
----------------------------------------------------------
Astros   Home   .260  .326  .405  .732   72  357  338  265
Astros   Away   .265  .334  .414  .748   79  371  350  378

(Figures are season averages of the Astros and their opponents combined.)

Not only did the Astros enjoy terrific production on average from the first base position from 1991 to 2004, but in most seasons, the Astros were in the top five at first base in virtually every important offensive category.

Seasons in top five in batting average at first base:

Astros 11 (1991-1996, 1998-2002)
Rockies 11
Reds 7

Seasons in top five in OBP at first base:

Astros 13 (1991-2002, 2004)
Rockies 9
Cardinals 7
Cubs 7

Seasons in top five in slugging average at first base:

Rockies 12
Astros 11 (1991, 1993-1994, 1996-2003)
Braves 7

Seasons in top five in OPS at first base:

Astros 13 (1991-2003)
Rockies 11
Cardinals 6

Seasons in top five in home runs at first base:

Rockies 12
Astros 11 (1994-2004)
Dodgers 8
Padres 8

Seasons in top five in runs at first base:

Astros 12 (1992, 1994-2004)
Rockies 11
Cardinals 7

Seasons in top five in RBI at first base:

Astros 10 (1992, 1994-2002)
Rockies 10
Braves 8

Seasons in top five in walks at first base:

Astros 13 (1991-1992, 1994-2004)
Cubs 9
Cardinals 7

Seasons in top five in runs created at first base:

Astros 13 (1991-2003)
Rockies 12
Cardinals 7

Worth noting is that the Astros were never out of the top five at first base in consecutive seasons in OBP, slugging avearge, OPS, runs, walks and runs created over that span. In batting average and RBI, the Astros only missed the top five at first base in consecutive seasons when Bagwell’s shoulder began to take its toll, in 2003 and 2004. And in home runs, the Astros only missed the top five at first base in consecutive seasons at the beginning of Bagwell’s career, from 1991 to 1993.

Again, given the park advantage enjoyed by the Rockies, it is clear that the Astros got the most prolific production, season on season, at first base during the era when Bagwell was the full-time starter.

Expanding beyond just first base, the Astros, from 1991 to 2004, were as productive at first base as almost any team/position combination in the National League.

Here are the lines on the top 10 team/position combinations:

Team          Pos   Avg   OBP   Slg    OPS   HR    R  RBI   BB   RC
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Giants         LF   .302  .437  .604  1.040  42  121  112  133  149
Rockies        1B   .326  .400  .590   .990  42  114  123   73  143
Rockies        RF   .318  .387  .557   .944  31  116  115   68  133
Astros         1B   .295  .400  .535   .935  33  112  112  102  127
Diamondbacks   LF   .298  .383  .519   .902  29  101  105   85  125
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Chicago        RF   .279  .346  .537   .883  43  101  118   64  117
Cardinals      CF   .284  .374  .507   .881  29  108   98   86  114
Expos          RF   .293  .358  .510   .868  28   95   96   61  113
Cardinals      1B   .282  .367  .499   .866  32   93  103   80  112
Phillies       RF   .293  .382  .475   .858  20   91   88   85  108

The only team/position combinations consistently ahead of the Astros at first base over that period were the Giants at left field (Barry Bonds, 1993-2004) and the Rockies at first base (Andres Galarraga, 1993-1997, Todd Helton, 1998-2004) and right field (Dante Bichette, 1993-1994, Larry Walker, 1995-2003).

So that puts Bagwell (and his subs) behind only the player stringing together the greatest offensive seasons in baseball history and some pretty good players in the best hitter’s park ever.

The Astros knew that year in and year out, what they would get from Bagwell was among the most productive offensive contributions in the National League. Maybe not the No. 1 performance in the league every season, but among the career years of other players, young stars on the rise and future Hall of Famers at their peaks, the Astros could count on a lethal combination of hitting for average, hitting for power, drawing walks, stealing bases and playing solid defense.

Bagwell was not like a box of chocolates. When he was healthy — until a degenerative shoulder condition made it too painful for him to continue playing the game for the team to which he devoted himself for his entire big-league career — you always knew what you were going to get.

If he set out to achieve consistency, Jeff Bagwell undoubtedly hit that one over the tracks onto Crawford Street. If only we could have seen it one last time.

It appears Bagwell may have been wasting his time getting ready to try to play first base for the Astros this season. That’s because, for unexplained reasons, January 31, 2006 is the deadline for the Astros to file an insurance claim to collect on a policy taken out on Bagwell’s $17-million-per-year contract.

Also for unexplained reasons, very few people seem to have been aware of this deadline until a week or two ago. Or at least that’s the first time it was reported publicly. In any event, Bagwell apparently must be able to show he can throw — a prerequisite for playing in the National League — as early as two months before Opening Day.

None of this makes much sense looking in from the outside. Bagwell obviously very much wants to attempt to play. He may be unable to do so, if his shoulder won’t let him get the ball even to second base without a skip or two. In which case, he’ll go on the disabled list, collect the rest of what’s owed him on his contract and hope to get a phone call from Cooperstown in late 2010.

But he does not want that decision made before he gets to step on the field again at spring training. He has reportedly been working hard to get the shoulder ready for another go.

From the Astros’ perspective, a retired Bagwell is better than a Bagwell shell of his former self. Even if Bagwell can throw, there is virtually no chance of him contributing at a level that makes $17 million a sound expenditure on him.

But even if Drayton McLane, for reasons of loyalty and sentimentality, really hopes Bagwell’s shoulder performs well enough for him to play first base, the Astros would be financially foolish not to file a claim in case Bagwell’s wing is too lame. And January 31, 2006 is the date the Astros must act to get the insurer to pick up $15.6 million of Bagwell’s hefty tab.

But maybe there is hope. Bagwell will get paid either way. The Astros, by filing a timely claim, will be covered for more than 90 percent of Bagwell’s salary. The one party really on the hook here is the insurer.

And the only way the insurer foists a pricey Bagwell farewell tour back to McLane is if the insurer’s doctors determine that Bagwell is able to play. Why would the insurer, on the hook for a sum equal to the per capita GDP of 10,000 Laotians, not want to give Bagwell a chance, even if it means waiting until spring training, to show he can play?

McLane says he wants to see if the insurer will let Bagwell attend spring training even if the Astros file the claim. This seems to be in the insurer’s best interest, in the event Bagwell shows he can play, making the Astros fully responsible for his salary.

Of course, there is another way: Bagwell could also be willing to cede his salary if he goes to spring training, finds he’s unable to play and the Astros fail to collect from their insurer. But that’s a lot to ask of any man, even if it means a final shot at reclaiming the position he has played as well as only a handful of men in baseball history.

Let’s hope it doesn’t come down to Bagwell having to retire without getting the chance to prove whether he still has something left in the tank — or having to consider putting $17 million on the line for the opportunity.

Moreover, General Manager Tim Purpura, previously described as “useless, ” bought the Astros a nice insurance policy by giving them the choice after the 2006 season of buying out Wilson for $500,000 or exercising a three-year option worth, with incentives, up to $9 million per season.

This gamble precisely suits the Astros, a mid-market team with a huge uncertainty in its line-up and significant existing contract commitments. Wilson’s 2006 salary is comparable to what the Cubs are paying Jacque Jones (3 years, $16 million) and the Cardinals are paying Juan Encarnacion (3 years, $15 million) on an annual basis.

If Jeff Bagwell cannot return to the line-up, the Astros can move Lance Berkman to first base and play Wilson in left field with Willy Taveras in center and Jason Lane in right. If Bagwell can play, the Astros have the option of trading Lane or Taveras. Either way, Chris Burke is likely more expendable (even if not any more marketable) now.

Better yet, manager Phil Garner would have the luxury of shuffling around Berkman, Wilson, Taveras and Lane as needed. Berkman would likely still see some time at first, since Bagwell’s 37-year-old surgically modified shoulder is unlikely to let him play every day.

Purpura was sanguine about Wilson’s capabilities as a proven run-producer. Wilson, like many other major-leaguers, has the tendency to drive in runs when he gets hits with teammates on base.

Wilson is coming off a five-year, $32-million contract that he signed in 2001 with the Marlins. Wilson’s oft-cited 2003 season, when he hit 36 home runs and led the league with 141 RBI, was aided by playing in Colorado.

In the four seasons from 1999 to 2002, Wilson hit 103 home runs and drove in 328 runs, not bad playing for the offense-deprived Marlins in a pitcher’s park. Here is a career breakdown of Wilson’s performance at Coors Field and elsewhere, per 162 games:

Place   Avg   OBP   Slg  2B  3B  HR    R  RBI  BB   SO  SB  CS
--------------------------------------------------------------
Coors  .280  .348  .527  42   2  34  103  133  56  144  14   9
Other  .261  .329  .466  31   3  28   83   94  54  166  20   9

The “other” row is not inconsistent with Wilson’s .261/.329/.443 performance with the Nationals last season.

Wilson does not look to help the Astros in their biggest area of need on offense, getting on base. And if the Astros decide to trade an existing outfielder, moving Wilson to center, keeping Lane (.267/.316/.499) in right and trading Taveras (.291/.325/.341) is probably the better bet, unless Taveras shows marked improvement at the plate.

Wilson gives the Astros flexibility and insurance, at a reasonable price, and reportedly will fit in well in a tame Astros clubhouse. Given what the market offered him, Purpura appears to have made a solid if unspectacular move to upgrade the offense and, perhaps more importantly, persuade Roger Clemens to return for a third season in Houston.

After Roger Clemens struck out to lead off, as Chris Burke walked to the plate, Dad inquired whether Burke ever hit home runs. “Not too much,” I replied. “But sometimes.” Three pitches later, I couldn’t hear Dad or anyone else around me say anything, with Minute Maid having erupted into 120-decibal bedlam from the grass in front of the Astros dugout all the way up to our seats just beneath the rafters.

For 20 years, Dad was a generous source of tickets to major sporting events. He took me to the 1986 All-Star Game, when Clemens first pitched as a major-leaguer before his hometown crowd. He gave his seats to Game 4 of the 1995 NBA Finals to me and my brother so we could be present to see the Rockets sweep their way to a second championship. (These weren’t the best tickets he ever surrendered — he gave a friend his seats for what became Nolan Ryan’s fifth no-hitter.)

Besides the big-time events, there were scores of Astros games about 10 rows behind the visitor’s dugout at the Astrodome, where Dad shared season tickets. I watched Craig Biggio and Jeff Bagwell grow into Hall of Fame careers from those seats.

After last season, and especially after Sunday, the Astros’ playoff disappointments of 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2001 seem as far away as their 1986 loss to the Mets. That Sunday’s marathon game was historic and special is without doubt.

But perhaps the greatest significance of the entire series is that the Astros made the Braves seem like the underdogs. The Astros were meant to win that game and the series. That’s easier to say now than it was Sunday when the Braves reached base in the 10th, 11th, 12th, 14th, 15th, 17th and 18th innings, each time held at bay by the Astros.

As hard as Game 4 might be for Atlanta fans to swallow, my sympathy runs shallow, having watched in hapless frustration from the Astrodome’s upper deck as the Astros failed to score off the Braves with the bases loaded and no outs in the 10th inning of Game 3 of the 1999 NLDS.

Or having watched (merely on TV) Kevin Bass swing at and miss a pitch in the dirt to end the 16th inning of NLCS Game 6 and send the Mets to the World Series in 1986. Or even having sat through 12 scoreless innings in Minute Maid’s field boxes earlier this season, on April 18, when Ryan Langerhans hit an inside-the-park homer to beat the Astros. (Hey, I’m not all bad luck. I was present when Eric Bruntlett homered to break a 15th-inning tie at Washington on July 24.)

Langerhans, Adam LaRoche (who hit crucial home runs off the Astros in NLDS Game 4 this year and last), Jeff Francoeur and Brian McCann (big homers in Games 1 and 4 of the 2005 NLDS) may be part of the youth movement that keeps churning out division titles for Bobby Cox. But the future will have to wait until the Astros’ old men, and some young players of Houston’s own, take care of unfinished business from last season.

One of the hardest parts of following a club that’s never won the World Series is seeing other fans have all the fun. Astros fans are slowly compiling a collection of those moments now. I’m grateful to have been able to share them with Dad.

He was beside me when Jeff Kent blasted a three-run shot off Jason Isringhausen in Game 5 of last year’s NLCS to take the series back to St. Louis with the Astros leading 3-2. And he was there Sunday. (I even got to take him to the All-Star Game last year, even if Clemens did get shelled off the mound in the first inning.) So Dad, after Sunday, we’re even.

That is, unless the Astros are still playing October 25, 26 and 27, in which case there’ll be a seat waiting for you beside me.

It is difficult to ascertain how much of the reaction to the disclosure that Palmeiro tested positive for steroids reflects actual outrage among fans as opposed to posturing indignation by baseball writers paid to fill column inches. Since Palmeiro’s return, the crowds have voted with their boos in his home park. Going on the road will likely be even less pleasant. Negative fan reaction makes news, but it is the writers who own a monopoly on Hall of Fame balloting. Some writers always look for a reason to withhold their vote, which is why nobody, not Ty Cobb (four dissenters) or Babe Ruth (11), not Hank Aaron (nine) or Willie Mays (23), has ever received a plaque unanimously.

And a sizable constituency of the scribes chafes at the idea of voting for any but the most deserving candidates on the first ballot, which is why it sometimes takes a year or two for players with sound credentials to get elected. The ballot is a privilege jealously guarded by writers who have lost to television much of their primacy as the game’s storytellers. Which is why much controversy may surround Palmeiro’s candidacy when he finally retires and waits the six years until he appears on the ballot. Palmeiro has overcome the two markers that traditionally guarantee election for a position player. He became the 19th player to hit 500 home runs in 2003 and this summer the 26th player to reach 3,000 hits.

With his 3000th hit, Palmeiro joined Aaron, Mays and Eddie Murray as the only players to reach both milestones. He has also moved considerably beyond 500 home runs, with 569 as of his suspension, and has the potential to hit 600, joining Aaron, Mays, Ruth, Barry Bonds and, probably by then, teammate Sammy Sosa in that inner circle. Those accomplishments, despite any other doubts in his record — an all-star “only” four times, never finishing higher than fifth in MVP voting, leading the league in a major category just three times (191 hits in 1990, 124 runs in 1993, 49 doubles in 1991) — would make it safe to bet that Palmeiro will enter the Hall of Fame.

Except for the steroids. If unelected, Palmeiro would obviously not be the first player denied entry to Cooperstown due to scandal. Pete Rose is one of just two members of the 4,000-hit club. It is legitimate to wonder why Palmeiro should be elected while Rose, with his many accomplishments, is excluded. Rose and Palmeiro both broke the rules. Rose’s offense, betting on baseball and on his own team, is rightly perceived as a threat to baseball’s integrity, since a player consorting with or, even worse, in debt to gamblers may be tempted to fix the outcome of the game. That is why baseball has long sought to distance itself from gambling.

But what Palmeiro did also disturbs baseball’s intergrity. Palmeiro’s actions, unlike Rose’s, were a form of cheating. Rose’s betting did not give him a competitive advantage over other players (or managers) like Palmeiro’s steroid use presumably did. Indeed, Rose got his 4,256 hits, three batting titles, 1973 MVP award and three World Series rings fair and square.

Whereas the numbers that have propelled Palmeiro’s candidacy may well be tainted. Palmeiro’s career statistics are a product of longevity, piling up solid seasons, including nine straight with more than 30 home runs and 100 RBI, into his late 30s. Did steroids allow him to maintain that consistent success? Thus, even without any moral or ethical objections to his induction, one could argue from a purely statistical perspective that the numbers otherwise making him worthy are ill-gotten. It is impossible to know whether Palmeiro would have reached 500 home runs or 3,000 hits without steroids. We do not even know when or for how long Palmeiro used them.

All we know is that he recently tested positive. But it is Palmeiro’s own fault that this is in doubt, because he is the one who injected uncertainty into the situation by using steroids. Even if he only used them once, well after hitting 500 home runs or getting within striking distance of 3,000 hits, Palmeiro created the presumption that his achievements were garnered by cheating. (This calls to mind Gaylord Perry, who doctored the ball on the way to 314 career victories. But the writers and fans seem more forgiving of Vaseline use than steroid use. In any event, the writers did inflict on Perry the minor inconvenience of waiting a couple of extra years for induction with 77 percent of the vote, despite Perry’s membership in the 300-win club.)

A crucial distinction does exist between Rose and Palmeiro. Rose broke rules that he knew would make him permanently ineligible if he got caught, and the Hall of Fame then changed its rules so that a permanently ineligible player may not appear on the ballot. Palmeiro’s positive test brought the meager sanction of 10 days’ suspension. This formalistic argument is not binding on the writers, however. Many people have argued that the penalties for steroid use should be increased substantially, including a lifetime ban. Attempting to impose enhanced penalties on Palmeiro retroactively, however, would drag the commissioner into a legal proceeding that he would surely lose.

But nothing prevents the writers, once Palmeiro appears on the ballot, from voting against him regardless of whether the rules then in place resulted in a petty penalty. In fact, there is reason to believe the writers would prefer the chance to exercise that judgment as opposed to having Palmeiro’s fate decided by a lifetime ban. There used to be speculation that the writers would elect Rose were he eligible to appear on the ballot. Indeed, he received write-in votes. Some writers complained bitterly about not being permitted to vote for him. Since that time, Rose’s lack of contrition has probably eroded his support. Even if reinstated now, it is too late for him to appear on the ballot absent a rule change.

But Palmeiro may face the humiliation of getting a chance before the writers and failing. That will be at least as humbling as the boos that he will likely hear from crowds the rest of the twilight of his career, or going back before Congress to be remonstrated by sanctimonious legislators to whom Palmeiro previously swore he never took steroids. Palmeiro says that the time will come when he will prove his denials that he ever took steroids. It would be marvelous if Palmeiro could provide evidence to clear his name. Nothing is more just than a condemned man proving his innocence. Moreover, it might spare us the media drama likely to play out when the Hall of Fame elections come around in 2012 or so.

Palmeiro’s will likely not be the first Hall of Fame election to feature this drama, though. Mark McGwire will appear on a ballot just around the corner in 2007.  He is the first worthy candidate likely to face serious questions about steroids. And he will not be the last, as Palmeiro, Bonds and others come up for a vote. It will take a long time to fully realize the effects of steroids on the record books, baseball history and the Hall of Fame. This summer’s discussion about Palmeiro is simply a taste of what is to come.